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15 results for “
"Additional Protocol"
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EFTA01753532
Dataset 10
2013-11-11
30p
7,910w
Subject:
November 11 upda e
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
…to enrich uranium or to install new ones, a promise to stop enriching uranium to 20%, which is near-weapons' grade, and to convert its existing stockpile into uranium oxide (a process that is reversible). What Iran has not promised to do is abide by the
Additional Protocol
of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which imposes additional reporting requirements on Iran and allows U.N. inspectors to conduct short-notice inspections of nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01753532.pdf
EFTA01756330
Dataset 10
2013-10-19
16p
8,466w
Subject:
October 19 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
…city of Arak, which is due to=come online sometime next year. I think these are two particular issues [t=at] the international community is going to be looking at very closely for significant Iranian concessions in=order to build up confidence that we can keep Iran significantly far from =uclear weapons capability. There was some t=lk about Iran agreeing to this so-called "
additional protocol
" that allows UN inspectors to come in without any real warning. Can you talk about that? This…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01756330.pdf
EFTA01951406
Dataset 10
2013-10-16
28p
6,592w
Subject:
October 16 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
…purposes. It would also cap the amount of enriched material, which the International Atomic Energy Agency would oversee. To ensure this, Iran would have to re-sign and implement the
additional protocol
, which would enable the IAEA to carry out much more EFTA_R1_00418448 EFTA01951408 thorough inspections. The Iranians would also have to guarantee that the Arak reactor is not functional. Fordow would be closed, and all Iranian nuclear activity would have to be carried out at Natanz. Last…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01951406.pdf
EFTA00663297
Dataset 9
2013-10-16
19p
6,563w
Subject:
October 16 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
…Iran has the presumptive right to enrich for nonmilitary purposes. It would also cap the amount of enriched material, which the International Atomic Energy Agency would oversee. To ensure this, Iran would have to re-sign and implement the
additional protocol
, which would enable the IAEA to carry out much more thorough inspections. The Iranians would also have to guarantee that the Arak reactor is not functional. Fordow would be closed, and all Iranian nuclear EFTA00663298 activity would have to…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00663297.pdf
EFTA01082221
Dataset 9
2012-04-18
6p
1,546w
…procured testimony being allowed in all cases subject to the Deposition? The Trustee shall promptly determine whether or not he needs to allocate any portion of time in the Deposition (or Rule 2004 examination) to question Rothstein on matters related to claims objections. 3. All attorneys presently designated to participate in the Deposition may submit any
additional protocol
ideas to Trustee's counsel and Defense Lawyers by May 4, 2011. Trustee's Counsel shall confer with Defense Lawyers and then…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA01082221.pdf
EFTA00973764
Dataset 9
2013-10-19
24p
8,672w
Subject:
October 19 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
…concessions in order to build up confidence that we can keep Iran significantly far from nuclear weapons capability. There was some talk about Iran agreeing to this so-called "
additional protocol
" that allows UN inspectors to come in without any real warning. Can you talk about that? This is a form of enhanced transparency, and something that has been the focus of interest for many years. The Iranians agreed to implement the "
additional protocol
" while Rouhani was the nuclear negotiator…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00973764.pdf
EFTA01948472
Dataset 10
2013-11-24
29p
6,954w
Subject:
November 25 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
…with Condoleezza Rice during the final Bush years, but it quickly returned to bomb-making. As for inspections, Mr. Obama hailed "extensive access" that will "allow the international community to verify whether Iran is keeping its commitments." One problem is that Iran hasn't ratified the
additional protocol
to its International Atomic Energy Agency agreement that would allow inspections on demand at such sites as Parchin, which remain off limits. Iran can also oust U.N. inspectors at any time…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01948472.pdf
EFTA01883885
Dataset 10
2012-05-18
48p
11,282w
Subject:
May 19 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
…convert for use in a bomb; (2) suspending 20 percent enrichment at the underground Fordow facility, a measure aimed at reducing Israel's concern that it may have to attack soon or lose the ability to curb the nuclear program altogether; and (3) pledging to accept the IAEA
Additional Protocol
, which gives the agency enhanced inspection rights to verify Iranian compliance. The latter step could also require Iran to answer the IAEA's questions about past activities. At this stage…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01883885.pdf
EFTA01948646
Dataset 10
2013-11-19
33p
8,076w
Subject:
November 20 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
…this with a caveat: that all monitoring activities be consistent with existing international regulations, laws, and treaties, and be approved by Iran's parliament. So, while Iran might ultimately agree to implement the IAEA's
Additional Protocol
(which many former nuclear inspectors consider inadequate), it is unlikely to accept more intrusive, tailored monitoring arrangements that would, in its eyes, reflect a discriminatory double standard toward Iran. (This has been Iran's long-standing position toward monitoring arrangements in past arms…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2010/EFTA01948646.pdf
EFTA02721203
Dataset 11
2012-05-18
48p
11,284w
Subject:
May 19 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
To:
jeeyacationggmail.com[
[email protected]
]
…convert for use in a bomb; (2) suspending 20 percent enrichment at the underground Fordow facility, a measure aimed at reducing Israel's concern that it may have to attack soon or lose the ability to curb the nuclear program altogether; and (3) pledging to accept the IAEA
Additional Protocol
, which gives the agency enhanced inspection rights to verify Iranian compliance. The latter step could also require Iran to answer the IAEA's questions about past activities. At this stage…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%2011/EFTA02721203.pdf
EFTA00022206
Dataset 8
2008-12-18
96p
49,772w
…on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime 1990;3 and the Commonwealth Scheme (the 'Harare Scheme')fi ETS No 30. 2 ETS No 99 and ETS No 182. The second
Additional Protocol
came into force in the UK on 1 October 2010. 3 ETS No 141. There is also a Council of Europe Convention on the Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation ofthe Proceeds from Crime and on the Financing of Terrorism (CETS No 198). which the…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%208/EFTA00022206.pdf
EFTA00636697
Dataset 9
2013-12-03
28p
9,851w
Subject:
December 3 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
…Iran to "suspend all further uranium enrichment-related activities" and "any reprocessing activities." The resolution called it "essential and urgent" for Iran to provide unrestricted access to IAEA inspectors, and requested that Iran "promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement" an
additional protocol
to its Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards. Nearly every year since then, the Western powers—first through the EU-3 and then through the P5+1 (the permanent members of the Security Council, including China and Russia…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00636697.pdf
EFTA00707105
Dataset 9
2013-11-15
22p
7,868w
Subject:
November 15 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen ‹ >
…given all of this appears to be one that allows Iran a fuel cycle but limits the amount of enrichment and the level of it (to 3.5 percent) and that, in addition, imposes even tighter verification mechanisms, including those provided for by NPT's
Additional Protocol
. Iran signed the Protocol in December 2003 but has not permitted its provisions to be implemented. Tehran has, however, indicated that it might be willing to do so under a quid pro quo…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00707105.pdf
EFTA01189624
Dataset 9
2013-11-06
38p
13,998w
Subject:
November 6 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen ‹ >
…it gives greater visibility on the conduct of Iran's nuclear program. Iran has reportedly offered to comply voluntarily for some months with the
Additional Protocol
(AP) to the NPT —which it has signed but not yet ratified and which authorizes more proactive and intrusive inspections—to encourage diplomatic progress. Tehran would ratify the AP—thereby committing to its permanent implementation—as part of a final deal. Second, the package aims to validate Iran's declarations that its enrichment infrastructure…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA01189624.pdf
EFTA00930275
Dataset 9
2012-02-20
23p
7,838w
Subject:
Feburary 19 update
From:
Office of Terje Rod-Larsen
…Iran's nuclear file at the UN Security Council and the IAEA. To meet the P5+1 conditions, Iran should accept the maximum level of transparency by implementing the IAEA's Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1 and the non-proliferation treaty's
Additional Protocol
, which broadly enable intrusive monitoring and inspections of nuclear facilities. To eliminate Western concerns about a possible nuclear weapons breakout using low-enriched uranium, any deal should place a limit on Iran's enrichment activities to…
https://www.justice.gov/epstein/files/DataSet%209/EFTA00930275.pdf
Corpus: 1990-03-17 – 2025-12-01
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Set 8
1
Set 9
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6
Set 11
1